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avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 35
The appellate division had upheld jurisdiction on the basis of the
broad language of Frummer and Gelfand. By rejecting this approach,
the Court of Appeals remained within the boundaries expressed in
Hanson. From a pragmatic viewpoint, German Volkswagenwerk AG's
activities were only those basic to engaging in international commerce
establishment of a subsidiary and shipment of goods to it. Certainly,
these activities, indistinct from those employed in interstate commerce,
are not a basis for in personam jurisdiction.
CPLR 325(d): Damages sought limited by monetary jurisdiction in
lower court after transfer by supreme court without plaintiff's consent.
CPA 110-b provided that the written consent of the plaintiff was
necessary to transfer a case from the supreme court to a lower court. 36
In 1962, however, a new state constitution was adopted. Article VI,
section 19(a), provides that
[t]he supreme court may transfer any action or proceeding, except
one over which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction which does not
depend upon the monetary amount sought, to any other court having jurisdiction of the subject matter within the judicial department provided that such3 7court has jurisdiction over the classes of
persons named as parties.
This provision has generally been viewed as self-executing s8 It was
devised to enable the supreme court to directly relieve its calendar
congestion. 9 Article VI, section 19(k), of the state constitution states
that
[t]he legislature may provide that the verdict or judgment in actions and proceedings so transferred shall not be subject to the
limitation of monetary jurisdiction of the court to which the actions and proceedings are transferred if the limitation be lower
than that of
the court in which the actions and proceedings were
40
originated.
85 Id. at 253.

36 Martirano v. Valger, 19 App. Div. 2d 544, 240 N.YS2d 792 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.).
CPLR 325(c) incorporates this consent requirement.
37 N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 19(a) (McKinney 1969).
38 American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bova, 32 App. Div. 2d 527, 300 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Ist
Dep't 1969) (mem.); Turntables, Inc. v. M.B. Plastics Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 792, 297
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam); Trussell v. Strongo, 29 App. Div. 2d 851, 288
N.Y.S.2d 125 (ist Dep't 1968) (per curiam); Garland v. Raunhein, 29 App. Div. 2d 383,
288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L.
Ray. 302, 316 (1968); 1 WK&M
325.04.
89 The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 313, 330 (1969).
40 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(k) (McKinney 1969).
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It was in light of this provision that the state legislature enacted CPLR
325(d), empowering the individual appellate divisions to act on this
matter.41 The Third42 and Fourth43 Departments have adopted appropriate rules, but as of yet the First and Second Departments have not
done So.44 Thus, the approach of the several departments is not uniform.
Haas v. Scholl" is a recent illustration of the problems which arise
in the departments which have not eliminated the lower court's damage ceiling in transfer cases. In denying the plaintiff's motion for reargument on the denial of a general preference in a negligence action,
the trial judge transferred the case down to the Westchester County
Court without the consent of the plaintiff, observing that the plaintiff
would be subject to the monetary ceiling of the lower court.46 Relying
upon Article VI, section 19(a), as the basis for its decision, the court
stated that it had "no authority to judicially abrogate the constitu47
tionally mandated monetary limitations of the County Court."
The instant case reflects the unequal positions of plaintiffs transferred under CPLR 325(d) in the different departments- a situation
which the court lamented. 48 The need for uniformity throughout the
state is evident.49 Additionally, Haas is vulnerable on the ground that
41 CPLR 325(d) was devised
to allow the supreme court, pursuant to Appellate Division rule, to transfer pending cases to lower courts in these judicial departments where the calendars of the
higher courts are so congested as to interfere with the efficient administration of
justice therein, but where the lower court calendars are clear enough to absorb
these extra leads.
FOURI'EENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF TnE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
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(1969). See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 325, commentary at 444 (1972).
42 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 861.18 (1968).
4322 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1024.20 (1970). See KIoc v. Cissell, 331 App. Div. 2d 885, 298
N.Y.S.2d 107 (4th Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
313, 330 (1969) (appellate division allowed transfer down to stand although the trial court
ignored the plaintiff's medical evidence, because the monetary ceiling of the transferee
court did not apply in view of the Fourth Department rules).
44 See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 825, commentary at 445 (1972):
In view of the congestion in the lower courts of the First and Second Departments,
implementing provisions in these departments do not seem to be in the offing.
45 68 Misc. 2d 197, 325 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971).
46 Id. at 202, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 851, citing 7B McK1NNEY'S CPLR 325, supp. commentary
at 269 (1965). Westchester County is in the Second Judicial Department.
47 68 Misc. 2d at 204, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
48 Id. at 204, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
The better procedure surely is to accord uniform treatment to all litigants in this
state and not unequal treatment predicated upon the mere happenstance of residency (or venue).
Id. at 205, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
49 The legislation was enacted in 1965 and vetoed on the ground that litigants would
seek to commence all actions in the supreme court and thereby increase that court's
calendar congestion. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 525, supp. commentary at 268-69 (1965).
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it violates the due process clause.50 The court limited the damages
allowable to the plaintiff before his cause of action was tried. If the
proof which the court required did not meet a certain objective standard, such as that required for summary judgment, the disposition was
arbitrary and therefore contrary to due process. A certain standard of
proof recognizable at law must be adduced to validate such a decision.
Thus, the Haas case may be challenged under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
ARTICLE

5 -VENUE

CPLR 511(b): The county specified as proper by defendant must in
fact be proper.
A plaintiff has the right, in the first instance, to choose the venue
of the action. CPLR 511(b) provides, however, that if the plaintiff's
choice is improper, the defendant may move to change the venue to
a county that "he specifies as proper." Will the county specified by
the defendant as proper be deemed so without regard to its propriety
in fact?
A domestic corporation stated in its certificate of incorporation
that Queens County was to be its principal place of business. Thereafter, it moved its facilities to Westchester County. Nevertheless, for
venue purposes as prescribed in CPLR 503(c), the corporation is
deemed to be a resident of Queens County and not Westchester
County.51 The defendant formally surrendered its authority to do business in New York prior to the commencement of this action, by filing
the requisite certificate. 52 As a foreign corporation, it had no residence
in New York for venue purposes. 53 The only proper place for this action, therefore, was the plaintiff's residence, Queens County." Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in Westchester
County. The defendant moved for a change of venue and, pursuant
to CPLR 511(b), specified New York County as a proper county. Its
contention was that it complied with the letter of the law in that it
was only required to name a county that it "specifies as proper," 5 the
50 "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). For a thorough discussion of the requirements
of procedural due process, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
53 See General Precision, Inc. v. Ametek, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 451, 257 N.YS.2d 120
(Sup, Ct. Westchester County), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
122, 143 (1965), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 757, 263 N.Y.S.2d 470 (2d Dep't 1965) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 121, 135 (1966); 7B McKINNEY'S

CPLR 503, supp. commentary at 12 (1965).
52 N.Y. Bus. CoiuP. LAW § 1310 (McKinney 1963).
53 Cf. 7B McKINEY's CPLR 503, commentary at 6 (1963).
54 CPLR 503(a).
55 CPLR 511(b).

